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Natural Philosophy
Natural philosophy was the part of philosophy that dealt with nature, and its users said what that part was. For Aquinas, “ens mobile sit subiectum naturalis philosophiae”, movable being is the subject of natural philosophy, and Aristotle’s Physics is also called On Natural Hearing, “quia per modum doctrinae ad audientes traditus fuit”, because it was handed down by way of teaching to listeners (In Physic. I lect. 1). Its place among the other parts is on the pages of the line: one of Aristotle’s three theoretical philosophies (Philosophy in Greece and Rome), the books on nature of the arts course (The schools and the universities), the trunk of Descartes’s tree and, for Bacon, the mother of the sciences (The new philosophy). Edward Grant, a historian of the medieval field, holds that natural philosophy and the exact sciences were distinct in the Middle Ages and fused in the seventeenth century into a “mathematized” natural philosophy (A History of Natural Philosophy, 2007, as quoted by Carolino).
Kant made mathematics the measure of science in the study of nature: “Ich behaupte aber, daß in jeder besonderen Naturlehre nur so viel eigentliche Wissenschaft angetroffen werden könne, als darin Mathematik anzutreffen ist”, I maintain that in any particular natural doctrine there is only as much science proper as there is mathematics in it (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, AA IV 470).
In the nineteenth century the name came to mean physics. Thomson and Tait, professors of natural philosophy at Glasgow and Edinburgh, opened their Treatise on Natural Philosophy (1867) with a definition: “The term Natural Philosophy was used by Newton, and is still used in British Universities, to denote the investigation of laws in the material world, and the deduction of results not directly observed. Observation, classification, and description of phenomena necessarily precede Natural Philosophy in every department of natural science. The earlier stage is, in some branches, commonly called Natural History.” Its point they gave in an epigraph from Fourier: “Les causes primordiales ne nous sont point connues; mais elles sont assujetties à des lois simples et constantes, que l’on peut découvrir par l’observation, et dont l’étude est l’objet de la philosophie naturelle”, first causes are not known to us, but they are subject to simple and constant laws which can be discovered by observation, and whose study is the object of natural philosophy. Its way was observation and experiment: “When, as in astronomy, we endeavour to ascertain these causes by simply watching their effects, we observe; when, as in our laboratories, we interfere arbitrarily with the causes or circumstances of a phenomenon, we are said to experiment” (§369). An English translator of 1873 could still render Helmholtz’s “Naturwissenschaften”, the natural sciences, as “natural philosophy”. Chairs of natural philosophy survive in the old universities, now held by physicists or mathematicians; Oxford’s Sedleian chair dates from 1621.
German Naturphilosophie is a different thing. For Schelling “eine Philosophie der Natur solle die Möglichkeit einer Natur, d. h. der gesammten Erfahrungswelt, aus Principien ableiten”, a philosophy of nature is to derive the possibility of a nature, that is, of the whole world of experience, from principles, for “Die Natur soll der sichtbare Geist, der Geist die unsichtbare Natur seyn”, nature should be visible spirit, and spirit invisible nature (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, 1797).
Others have called for natural philosophy itself to return. For Nicholas Maxwell, in Newton’s time science and philosophy “formed one mutually interacting, integrated endeavour of natural philosophy: to improve our knowledge and understanding of the universe, and to improve our understanding of ourselves as a part of it … But then natural philosophy died. It split into science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other” (“In Praise of Natural Philosophy”, 2012). Alister McGrath’s Natural Philosophy: On Retrieving a Lost Disciplinary Imaginary (2023), in its publisher’s description, takes natural philosophy as “enfolding the two quite different notions of learning about and learning from nature” and argues for the retrieval of its “disciplinary imaginary”. Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Lee Smolin subtitled their book A Proposal in Natural Philosophy (2015): “The proximate subject matter of the philosophy of science is science. The proximate subject matter of natural philosophy is nature. Unlike the philosophy of science, natural philosophy shares its subject matter with science”, and “Natural philosophy, however, cannot be at the beginning of the twenty-first century what it was at the beginning of the nineteenth. It must turn into something else”. Whitehead had used the name for his own project and drawn its boundary: “we can think about nature without thinking about thought. I shall say that then we are thinking ‘homogeneously’ about nature”, and “Natural philosophy should never ask, what is in the mind and what is in nature” (The Concept of Nature, 1920).
Whether natural philosophy was early science at all is disputed. Andrew Cunningham argued that natural philosophy was “about God” and about “God’s universe”, in the catalogue summary of his 1991 article, and, with Perry Williams (1993), that science was invented only in 1760–1848. Grant answered that natural philosophy gave natural explanations of natural things, and reviewers place the disagreement in method: the historical actors’ own categories against the historian’s.