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Definitions of Life

This page takes the word in one of its senses: life as in “the origin of life” or “life on other planets”, the phenomenon that a biologist studies and a space mission looks for. In this sense the question is what separates what has life from what does not, and much of the modern literature comes from where that question is practical, origin-of-life research and the search for life elsewhere. The working definition from NASA’s exobiology group is the best-known product, and Oparin’s and Horowitz’s formulations came out of the same two lines of work. The life a person lives is another sense of the word, and it is not what these definitions are after.

The field has sorted its own definitions several times. Carl Sagan, in the Britannica of 1970, set out five: physiological, metabolic, biochemical, genetic and thermodynamic. Trifonov found nine groups of defining terms in 123 definitions. Malaterre and Chartier, text-mining 30,000 articles, found matter and energy, structure, environmental interactions, evolution and information. Mariscal lines these sortings up in a table and calls the match rough; “most of the definitions considered by these authors straddle some of these distinctions”.

The sort below is by what a definition goes by, and straddling is to be expected. The working definition from NASA’s exobiology group, for one, is both chemical and evolutionary. Each entry also says what the word is doing, since a definition of life, a definition of the living thing and a definition of something else entirely are often reported as the same.

What it is made of

“Life is the mode of existence of albuminous bodies,” wrote Engels in Anti-Dühring, “and this mode of existence essentially consists in the constant self-renewal of the chemical constituents of these bodies”. “Albuminous” and “protein” are the translators’ words for a substance whose composition, he says, was little known; it is not the modern concept. He added that “our definition of life is naturally very inadequate”. Patrick Forterre took the definition up again in 2010, ending it at “life is the mode of existence of living organisms”.

Sagan’s biochemical definition belongs here, and so does his worry about it, reported by Mariscal as “Earth Chauvinism”: a definition by substance may only describe our own chemistry. Steven Benner lists carbon and the cell among the “definition-theories” that mission designers hold.

What it does

The oldest family makes a list. Aristotle: “by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with its correlative decay)”. He also noted that the word “has more than one sense, and provided any one alone of these is found in a thing we say that thing is living”: thinking, perception, local movement, or nutrition, decay and growth (tr. Smith). Xavier Bichat in 1800: “la vie est l’ensemble des fonctions qui résistent à la mort”, life is the sum of the functions that resist death.

The modern lists are longer. Sagan’s physiological definition took life to be “any system capable of performing a number of such functions as eating, metabolizing, excreting, breathing, moving, growing, reproducing, and being responsive to external stimuli” (as quoted by Birch). Ernst Mayr gave eight hallmarks of living systems. Tibor Gánti separated five absolute criteria of a living organism from three potential ones, growth and reproduction, hereditary change and evolution, and mortality, a split reported as a way of handling sterile organisms (Deplazes-Zemp). Daniel Koshland’s seven pillars of 2002 aim at any life, artificial and alien included.

The objections follow the form. Claude Bernard said of Bichat’s definition that “la science, il faut le dire, a condamné cette définition”, science has condemned it, and charged the definitions in general with “définir la vie par la vie”, defining life by life. Of Mayr’s list, Mark Bedau wrote that “each of the hallmarks can be possessed by non-living things”. Koshland’s own story of the rabbits makes the opposite point: “Then one rabbit is dead. Two rabbits—a male and female—are alive but either one alone is dead” (as quoted by Benner).

What keeps it running

Schrödinger asked in 1944: “What is the characteristic feature of life? When is a piece of matter said to be alive?” His answer is that it goes on “doing something”, for longer than an inanimate piece of matter would, and “what an organism feeds upon is negative entropy”. He later noted that this had “met with doubt and opposition from physicist colleagues”.

Ernst Haeckel took life to be “a special process of movement”, consisting “essentially in a circulation of matter, or metabolism”. Oparin called metabolism “that form of the motion of matter which is characteristic of life”. Energy and thermodynamics account for 26% of the definitions in the 2026 survey. The standing objection is the flame. “Life processes energy, but so does fire,” as Mariscal puts it, and Horowitz noted that flames show metabolism and growth, and “reproduce (by means of sparks)”.

Its form

Here the mark is organisation. Lamarck in 1809: “un ordre et un état de choses” in a body that permits organic movements, an order and state of things. J. B. S. Haldane in 1949, having opened with “I am not going to answer this question”: “life is essentially a pattern of chemical happenings”, which “regulates itself as a flame does not except to a slight extent”. The flame recurs.

Maturana and Varela defined an “autopoietic machine”, a network of processes of production that regenerates the network that produced it and constitutes it as a unity in space, and they claim the notion is necessary and sufficient to characterise a living system. Their defined term is not “life”. Margulis took it over for the word alive: “To be alive, an entity must first be autopoietic—that is, it must actively maintain itself against the mischief of the world”. Robert Rosen’s “organisms are closed to efficient causation” defines the organism; it is his readers who call it a definition of life. Against autopoiesis, Luisi’s group built “autopoietic vesicles” that are not alive (as reported by Deplazes-Zemp).

Langton took form furthest. Artificial life, he wrote, “views life as a property of the organization of matter, rather than a property of the matter which is so organized” (as quoted on Wikiquote), and it places “life-as-we-know-it” within “life-as-it-could-be”. This states a field’s view and does not say what the organisation is.

How it evolves

This is the largest modern family. Horowitz in 1966: “living organisms are systems that reproduce, mutate, and then reproduce their mutations”. John Maynard Smith reported the suggestion that “entities with the properties of multiplication, variation, and heredity are alive” (as quoted on Wikiquote). Trifonov reduced the vocabulary of his 123 definitions to “Life is self-reproduction with variations”. Bedau took “supple adaptation” to define life at its most general, while saying it is not a necessary and sufficient condition for living organisms.

The best-known sentence is NASA’s: “Life is a self-sustaining chemical system capable of Darwinian evolution”. It came from a panel, and the name is loose. Gerald Joyce, who wrote it up in a foreword, said “No, it’s not mine” and “there’s nothing official about it. Nobody voted on it”. One sentence gives the field three outcomes. For Joyce “a virus doesn’t make the cut”. Mariscal: “It might include viruses while excluding mules”. Benner reads the panel as allowing that a “cell, virus, or a single rabbit” may be alive without exemplifying life. Joyce’s answer on the mule is that “capable” applies to the system: “It’s the population, or even the ecology, that makes the living system.”

Benner notes that “Homo sapiens as a species is already stretching our definition-theory of life”, through inheritance that is not Darwinian. Sara Imari Walker defines life without the chemistry: “all objects that can only be produced in our universe through a process of evolution and selection”.

What it carries

Some definitions go by information. Walker and Paul Davies wrote in 2013 of “the transition to context-dependent causation – mediated by the onset of information control – that is the key defining characteristic of life”. Christoph Adami’s short answer in the 2026 survey is “information that can replicate itself” (as quoted by Bender et al.). Information also appears inside other families: Gánti has an information-carrying subsystem among his criteria, Koshland’s first pillar is a program, and Joyce says “self-sustained” means that “all of the information necessary” is in the system. The surveys keep it apart from evolution. Malaterre and Chartier give the two separate headings, as does Mariscal.

How it stands to its surroundings

Herbert Spencer gave “the broadest and most complete definition of Life” as “the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations”. Bernard made the same turn against Kant: “le principe d’action des corps vivants n’est pas intérieur”, the principle of action of living bodies is not internal, since it cannot be separated from external conditions. Trifonov has environment among his groups, and Malaterre and Chartier have environmental interactions.

At the largest scale the question is the planet. Lovelock and Margulis wrote in 1974 that “early after life began it acquired control of the planetary environment”. W. Ford Doolittle objected that the Earth “could not evolve in principle” (as reported by Mariscal), and Stephen Jay Gould called the idea “a metaphor, not a mechanism”. Margulis herself: “Gaia is not an organism”.

How it acts

Kant defined life as acting: “das Vermögen eines Wesens, nach Gesetzen des Begehrungsvermögens zu handeln”, a being’s capacity to act according to laws of the faculty of desire. He concluded that “alle Materie als solche leblos”, all matter as such is lifeless. His account of the organised being in the third Critique is a separate matter and is not a definition of life. Kauffman’s autonomous agent, “something that can both reproduce itself and do at least one thermodynamic work cycle”, is often presented as a definition of life, though the term he defines is the agent. Carlos Gershenson objected with worker ants, which are alive and do not reproduce.

Friston in 2013: “biological systems act on their environment—unlike a petrified stone with low entropy”. He calls life “an inevitable and emergent property” of systems with a Markov blanket, and that is a claim about when “lifelike” behaviour arises. The 2026 survey gives autonomy and agency, and cognition and intelligence, lines of their own. Chris Fields’ answer there puts the observer into the definition: “to be alive is to be considered alive by systems that consider themselves alive” (as quoted by Bender et al.).

Those who decline

Bernard opened his lectures of 1878 by going through the definitions “dans le but bien différent de prouver que la tentative est chimérique”, to prove the attempt chimerical. “On peut caractériser la vie, mais non la définir”, life can be characterised but not defined. He still left two formulas, “la vie, c’est la création” and, paradoxically, “la vie c’est la mort”.

Carol Cleland and Christopher Chyba compare the search to “those hoping to define ‘water’ before the existence of molecular theory”. Jack Szostak’s title says that “attempts to define life do not help to understand the origin of life”. Tirard, Morange and Lazcano recall that some concepts can be defined while others only have a history. Others defend the activity. Benner holds that a definition is tied to a theory and that the theory still guides design, and Mix that “provisional definitions are necessary for clear communications”. Forterre calls it “clearly not a scientific question, but a philosophical one”; on viruses, “it is our choice to decide”.

Across the families

Several questions cut through the sort, and the field asks them in its own terms.

Life or alive. The noun and the adjective do not always mean one thing. Benner: “one rabbit may be alive even though he or she is not life”. Walker separates them on purpose: “Being ‘alive,’ by contrast, is the active implementation of the dynamics of evolution and selection”, and “some objects — like a dead cat — are representative of ‘life’… but not themselves ‘alive’”.

Individual or collective. Whether the word applies first to an organism or to a population (Parke, as reported by Mariscal). Walker: “Only populations evolve — individuals do not”. Bedau answers the mule by connecting it to systems that do adapt.

Material or functional. Whether life goes with the stuff or with what the stuff does (Parke). Engels and Langton mark the ends.

Sharp or graded. Whether there is a clean boundary or a continuum (Parke). Tirard, Morange and Lazcano: if the emergence of life was a stepwise transition, “it may be meaningless to draw a strict line”.

Entity or process. Whether life is a thing or something going on. Bender et al. use it as an axis, with a second running from observer-dependent to objective.

How far the word reaches. Haeckel meant it literally of crystals: “Alle Kristalle … sind lebendig, so lange sie wachsen und sich entwickeln”, all crystals are living as long as they grow and develop. Bedau allows that clay crystallites, chemical networks and economies “deserve to be thought of as living if they exhibit supple adaptation”. Walker holds, in her defined sense, that “technology is not artificially replacing life — it is life”, and grants that “many of us would not recognize mineral diversity as ‘life’”. Hazen and his co-authors stretch the other word: their 2023 paper speaks of the “evolution of varied systems, including stars, minerals, atmospheres, and life”, with life one item in the list.


See also: Life (the subject landing) · Evolution · Autopoiesis · Assembly theory · Mineral evolution · Aristotle · Schrödinger · Langton · Walker