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Martin Heidegger (1889–1976)

Heidegger broke the spectator model of knowledge. Being-in-the-world — always already involved, always already understanding — replaced the subject contemplating objects with a being inseparable from its world. In the later work, language becomes the medium through which Being discloses itself: not a tool humans use but something they dwell in.

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Asked the question of Being — not what exists, but what it means to be. His answer displaced the subject-object split that had structured Western philosophy since Descartes. We do not first exist and then encounter a world; we are always already in a world, disclosed through our involvement with it. Heidegger served as rector of Freiburg University in 1933–34 under the Nazi regime, joined the NSDAP, and never publicly recanted. The Black Notebooks (published 2014 onward) revealed antisemitic passages. The relationship between his philosophy and his politics remains one of the most debated questions in twentieth-century intellectual history.


Key concepts

Dasein. Heidegger’s term for the kind of being that we ourselves are — the being for whom its own being is an issue. Dasein is not a subject contemplating objects. It is being-in-the-world: always already involved, always already understanding, always already ahead of itself.

Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein). The world is not a container that Dasein is placed into. It is the structure of meaningful relations that Dasein inhabits. Tools, others, projects, moods — these are not additions to a bare existence but constitutive of what it means to be.

Readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand (Zuhandenheit / Vorhandenheit). Things are first encountered as equipment — ready-to-hand, used without being noticed. Only when something breaks or goes missing does it become present-at-hand — an object of detached observation. The theoretical attitude is derived from the practical, not the other way around.

Disclosure (Erschlossenheit). The world is not discovered by a subject — it is disclosed through Dasein’s involvement. Understanding, mood, and discourse together open up the world as a field of meaning. Truth, for Heidegger, is not correspondence but unconcealment (aletheia).

Thrownness (Geworfenheit). Dasein does not choose its starting point. It finds itself already in a situation — a historical moment, a culture, a mood — that it did not create but must take up. Freedom is not the absence of constraint but the taking-over of what is given.

Temporality. The meaning of Dasein’s being is time. Not clock time but the ecstatic unity of past (having-been), present (being-alongside), and future (being-ahead-of-itself) — held together in each moment. Being-toward-death gives Dasein its finitude and its urgency: it is the horizon against which everything matters. Historicity — Dasein’s capacity to take up its own past and project toward its future — follows from this temporal structure.

The turn (die Kehre). After Being and Time, Heidegger’s thinking shifted. Early Heidegger approached Being through the analysis of Dasein. Later Heidegger turned toward Being itself — its history, its withdrawal, the way it discloses and conceals itself across epochs. The subject recedes; language, poetry, and technology become the sites where Being shows itself.

Language. “Language is the house of Being” (Letter on Humanism, 1947). In the later work, language is not a tool humans use — it is the medium through which Being discloses itself. “Language speaks” (Die Sprache spricht): we do not master language; we dwell in it. Poetry, for Heidegger, is language at its most disclosive — the place where what is concealed comes to word.

The age of the world picture. In “The Age of the World Picture” (1938) man becomes subiectum with Descartes: “Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such”, and the world picture is “not … a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture” (tr. Lovitt). An appendix ties this to an end: “With Descartes begins the completion and consummation of Western metaphysics … Through anthropology the transition of metaphysics into the event of the simple stopping and setting aside of all philosophy is introduced.” Young and Haynes render the last words “the simple cessation and suspension of all philosophy”.

The end of philosophy. In “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (1964; first published in French in 1966, in German in Zur Sache des Denkens, 1969) Heidegger reads the end of philosophy as its completion in the sciences. “Philosophy is metaphysics”, and its end “means the completion of metaphysics. However, completion does not mean perfection”: the old meaning of “end” is place, the gathering of philosophy’s uttermost possibilities. The word translated “completion” is Vollendung, which, as David Farrell Krell notes in his edition of the essay, stresses the full rather than the ending. The sciences’ independence “looks like the mere dissolution of philosophy, yet in truth is precisely its completion”, and they will be regulated, he expected, by cybernetics. What is left is a task for thinking, which “is less than philosophy”.

What philosophy is. His lecture “Was ist das – die Philosophie?” (Cerisy-la-Salle, 1955) confined itself, as Dominique Janicaud reports, to the Greek origin of philosophy, starting from “The Greek word philosophia indicates the direction”. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy sums up his later metaphilosophy as holding “that: philosophy is metaphysics; metaphysics involves a fundamental mistake; metaphysics is complicit in modernity’s ills; metaphysics is entering into its end; and ‘thinking’ should replace metaphysics/philosophy”. Its method, as the IEP quotes him, is “a destruction … in which the traditional concepts … are deconstructed down to the … sources from which they were drawn”; the later thinking is “a kind of thoughtful questioning”, and “All philosophical thinking” is “in itself poetic”. What thinking promises is “a new ground and a new foundation upon which we can stand and endure in the world of technology without being imperiled by it” (Discourse on Thinking).


The political stain

Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism cannot be separated from his philosophy, however much one might wish to. He joined the NSDAP in 1933, served as rector of Freiburg under the regime, and never publicly recanted. The Black Notebooks revealed antisemitic passages woven into his philosophical reflections. Whether the philosophy is contaminated by the politics or survives despite it remains an open question. The specific concepts — being-in-the-world, disclosure, language as medium — have been taken up widely and independently of the thinker. The debt is acknowledged; the stain is not excused.


Where Heidegger stops

Heidegger’s later work grows increasingly solitary — Being withdraws, poetry replaces argument, and the thinker waits. The participatory structure of being-in-the-world gives way to a quietism where only a few poets and thinkers can hear Being speak. Rorty and Wittgenstein pick up the early insight — always already involved, always already in language — and carry it toward the relational and the plural. Whether the participatory structure can be recovered without the quietism is a question his later work does not ask.


Key works


See also: Phenomenology · Symbolic forms · The standing of aesthetics in philosophy · The counter-current · Deconstruction · Cognition · Cognition in Core Philosophy · Hermeneutics · Hermeneutics: the ontological turn and the disputes · Philosophy of History · The Critical Tradition · Metaphysics · The disclosive branch · Husserl · Rorty · Wittgenstein