The End of Philosophy, Really?

In 2010 Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow wrote in The Grand Design: “philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics.” Others had said much the same. Steven Weinberg said he knew of no one in postwar physics “whose research has been significantly helped by the work of philosophers”.

Philosophy judged by what it does for physics. Some replies came from within physics itself. Carlo Rovelli: “Those who deny the utility of philosophy, are doing philosophy.” The scientists’ sentiment is not new. In 1886 Nietzsche was already writing against “the declaration of independence of the scientific man, his emancipation from philosophy”.

But the negative opinion does not only reside with scientists. Philosophers have been announcing the end of philosophy for two hundred years.

Hegel wanted philosophy to “lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge”: an end by arriving.

Marx: “You cannot abolish philosophy without making it a reality”, where the German for abolish, aufheben, also means to keep and to raise: an end by realising.

Carnap set out to overcome metaphysics by logical analysis, and asked what was left for philosophy: “only a method”. An end by overcoming.

Heidegger called the independence of the sciences the end of philosophy in the sense of its completion, and added that “completion does not mean perfection”: an end by completing.

Derrida, glimpsing the closure of an epoch of metaphysics: “I do not say the end.”

Arrival, realisation, overcoming, completion, closure. What is it that ends? Almost always metaphysics. The end of philosophy as the judge and jury of every other kind of knowledge: what Rorty spelled with a capital P, “the Platonic attempt to sift out the merely contingent and conventional truths from the Truths which were something more than that”. Most also name what carries on: a method for Carnap, thinking for Heidegger, philosophy with a small p for Rorty.

Philosophy has been giving its subjects away for a long time. Bertrand Russell made the point in 1912: “as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science.” Astronomy went that way, then psychology; and Newton’s great work, he reminds us, was called “the mathematical principles of natural philosophy”. That natural philosophy is called physics now.

Once a subject reaches what Hegel called actual knowledge, it leaves and takes a name of its own. But it does not leave philosophy behind altogether. It keeps some at its foundations, a ‘philosophy of’.

This was not yet in view when Russell wrote. In 1912 the subjects had gone, but the ‘philosophy of’ had not yet taken up its position. A general philosophy of science came first, in the 1930s, with the Vienna Circle and its journals: Carnap’s method made into a discipline. The philosophies of the separate sciences came later, from the 1960s on, after Kuhn: philosophy of biology, and of physics as a field of its own. These are the years of Heidegger’s end of philosophy and Derrida’s closure of an epoch. By the time Hawking wrote, the philosophy of physics had been a specialism for a generation, and replies came from within it too.

Knowledge keeps growing, and the quest for it keeps making specialisms. Each one sends questions back as it goes: what its terms mean, what its results show, how it joins up with the others. Philosophy may only look as if it is losing, because its successes leave and take other names. But doesn’t each new specialism give it a chance to grow, rather than another subject to lose?

This post is part of the conversations series. See also the reference entries on the end of philosophy and scientists on philosophy, part of the metaphilosophy subject.


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