The Man Who Kept Changing His Mind

There was a running joke about Hilary Putnam. Every decade, a new realism. It made it into Daniel Dennett’s Philosophical Lexicon, the philosophers’ in-house dictionary of coined insults and affectionate jabs, where a hilary is defined as a very brief but significant period in a philosopher’s career. Scientific realism in the sixties. Internal realism from the late seventies. Natural realism in the nineties. Three positions, one career, and the word “realism” stretched across all of them like a tent over a man who kept moving.

Scientific realism, in the strong form he first held: our best theories are approximately true, the things they posit — electrons, genes, fields — really exist, and there is one true and complete description of the world for science to approach; anything less would make the success of science a miracle.

Internal realism says: yes, all true, but only within a conceptual scheme; what counts as an object depends on the framework in use, and a world of three individuals holds three objects or seven depending on how you count — with no answer beneath the counting.

And then natural realism: enough apparatus — we perceive the world directly, mind and body and world one threefold cord, and the ordinary claim that the cup is on the table needs no theory standing behind it.

Notice what changes each time: not just the doctrine, but the register. You can hear it. The first speaks laboratory. The second speaks framework. The third speaks kitchen table.

And that is the turn worth making. Read the three not just as three answers to one question — what is real? — but as answers given in three languages, each putting the word “real” to work. Each realism comes out right within the context of its language. What none of them gets to be is the owner of the word.

Read that way, the first change stops looking like retreat. It can be heard as a vocabulary giving up its claim to be the vocabulary: the scientific realist stops holding that science’s language is the one true description of the world, and what looked like a loss of nerve is a language declining an office it had been given.

The second change is different. Putnam did not leave internal realism by loosening it further. Truth as idealised rational acceptability could not accommodate truths lying beyond any possible verification. And he held that there are such truths, the unrecoverable past being one of his examples. The picture of perception that came with it put representations between the subject and the world, making perception a veil rather than a contact. Giving up both moved him towards realism, not further from it. He said as much: internal realism was an error, and he was a realist again, if not a metaphysical one.

So the direction did change. Something else, though, did not. Conceptual relativity — the three individuals and the seven sums, the count with no answer beneath it — is the piece Putnam carried out of the middle period and never gave back. It is also the piece that sits nearest to Richard Rorty, who held that there are only vocabularies all the way down, and with whom Putnam argued for thirty years. He thought he could hold it without the verificationist truth it had arrived attached to, and the later work is largely the attempt to show how.

Which leaves an irony. Reading a career as three languages, each right within itself and none owning the word, is internal realism’s own move applied to a life instead of a world. The tool comes from the phase Putnam later called a mistake. Whether that disqualifies the reading or recommends it depends on what you make of the part he kept — and the tool is precisely that part.

This post is part of the conversations series. See also the reference entries on Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty.


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