Pluralism and the Interrelational

A while ago, in From Seed to Interrelational Pluralism, I called SPLectrum the home of interrelational pluralism. It is a position I arrived at from the seed principles alone. Here I want to frame it around the pluralism side.

Pluralism is not one doctrine but a family, and philosophy kept joining it by accident. Ask what reality is made of, and some answered: many kinds of things, not one substance. Ask how we know, and some answered: many valid ways, no single method. Ask about language: many games, none ranking another. Ask about the good: many values that genuinely conflict and will not be ranked on one scale. Ask about power: many centres, dispersed, no container holding all authority. Five different questions, asked in different centuries by people who mostly never read each other — and the same conclusion every time. Many, none privileged. What strikes me most about this is that it consists of a number of similar tracks but never joined up.

And rightly so: they never joined up in content — each with its own approach to what it wants to say and contribute. However, they all use language with a high degree of common understanding. And that is SPLectrum’s interrelational pluralism point: the tracks have equal standing but are joined in the medium of expression — relational language — and the high level of shared expression of meaning: common understanding. Interrelational pluralism is about pluralist voices within envelopes of common understanding, mindful of their specific cultural backgrounds and historicities. The borders and disputes are easier to meet from there — the envelope holds while the voices stay many.

Take the monism border. With my SPLectrum hat on I say: yes to monism on the how — the medium of language and expression of meaning — but no to monism on content, on what is being said. There is room for the pluralistic voice, be it value pluralism with Isaiah Berlin or James’ pluralistic universe; there is room for freedom of expression. Rather than content monism, what matters are sensible means of coexistence.

But does this not result in relativism? If there are many and none is privileged, does anything go? No, and for two reasons. First, there is subjective convergence within one’s own community: subject realities cluster around what is shared. And second, the dynamic of coexistence between communities will explore convergence/divergence from their base of common understanding. There is no relativism — what would it be compared with? — but an internal dynamic that drives convergence.

The pluralist claim of no privileged view is often refuted as being itself a privileged view — but the objection confuses the levels. The privileged view referred to is not on content: there is no privileged view on what is being said — only the shared medium in which both the claim and its refutation are made.

I like to finish this post on the realism question within pluralism: if there are many valid accounts and none is privileged, can any of them be called real or does it collapse into “none really true”?

To begin with, a few questions: what is a valid account? what does really true mean? Doesn’t that depend on the language one speaks, how meaning is expressed? What is the standard for an absolute viewpoint apart from “because I say so”? I say: have confidence in the many and value the creativity of each — there is power in subjective convergence, in the strength of identity and belonging.

So how many realities are genuinely held? SPLectrum’s answer is simple: as many realities as there are subjects. How many shared realities are being held? A lot less; subject realities are strongly clustered around these shared realities: all subjects belong. Will it eventually converge into one, to reflect a world that might be out there independently? I don’t know, and I don’t think it matters. Why should our accounts have to be answerable to something that is not known?

This post is part of the conversations series. See also Pluralism.

Photo: Tudor Photography / Unsplash